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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON THE EXPULSION
AND EXCLUSION OF ALIENS
Events of the past year have focused attention on the immigra-
tion policies of the United States. Recent Supreme Court decisions
have helped to crystallize the always-competing policies underlying
the question of the constitutional restraints on the handling of the
expulsion and exclusion powers. The number of deportations is in-
creasing,' and the Attorney General announced that he would
exclude a long-time resident from re-entry into the country where
he has made his home. 2 The passage of the McCarran-Walter Im-
migration Act has not lessened the constitutional problems in the
field.
1. The latest available reports show that the number of aliens deported
in 1951 was more than twice the number deported during 1950. Rep. Attey Gen.
23 (1951).
2. Former Attorney General McGranery on Charlie Chaplin, N. Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1952, p. 1, col. 5.
NOTES
THE POWER
The judicial handling of expulsion and exclusion of aliens might
be analyzed in terms of three competing principles. The first is the
undoubted power of a sovereign state to control immigration into
its borders, and the practical necessity of handling the problem
through administrative agencies. The second is that principle which
recognizes resident aliens as "persons" within the terms of the Fifth
Amendment, and entitled to the constitutional protection of due
process of law as to life, liberty and property. The third is that which
arises because the control over immigration inevitably involves the
rights of citizens.
Whether Congressional control of immigration is based upon
the power to regulate foreign commerce,3 or inheres in sovereignty
and therefore need not be found in one of the delegated powers
of the Constitution,4 it is a power which for the most part can only
be handled by the political departments. As a general rule, there-
fore, the courts have regarded the issues arising from that control,
including the expulsion of resident aliens, as exclusively a political
matter with which they will not interfere.5 This plenary power has
been justified as an inalienable right of every sovereign and inde-
pendent nation, not limited by the fact that the aliens subject to it
may have become "entangled" in other prohibitions of law.6
The power to exclude being absolute and unqualified, a statute
in exercise of that power was early held to apply to an alien who
leaves temporarily and then seeks to re-enter, even though he had
previously entered the United States in accordance with its im-
migration laws and had established a domicile here .7t was also said
that since the reception of an alien was purely a matter of privilege,
his entrance created no obligation whatever upon the United States.
3. See Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 591 (1884).
4. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 711 (1893);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 609 (1889) ; Konvitz, The Alien and the
Asiatic in American Law 12, 55 (1946). This unrestrained power is justified
by an appeal to International Law for recognition of the inherent power of
every sovereign to forbid the entrance of aliens or admit only on conditions
it may prescribe. It is interesting to note in this connection that the United
States has regarded as a breach of International Law the expulsion of an
alien outside the authority of the expelling nation's constitution. U. S. Foreign
Rel.: 1908 at 774, 777 (Dep't State 1912).
5. See Fellman, The Aliet's Right to Work, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 137, 139
(1938) ; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8
Minn. L. Rev. 485, 492 (1924).
6. United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director, 120 F. 2d 762 (2d
Cir. 1941).
7. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895).
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Thus, he could be expelled from residence in this country as well
as excluded from entry upon whatever ground Congress might
choose and without judicial process," even though the grounds would
be an abridgement of the First Amendment if the basis of a statute
enacted pursuant to a less sacrosanct power.9
REVIEw OF ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Finality of Agency Determination
A very significant corollary to the omnicompetence of Congress
to exclude and deport has been the right to delegate the enforcement
of immigration laws to executive officers, who have the power to
make regulations in accordance with the statute.10 Early decisions
went far in sustaining the conclusiveness of the administrative hear-
ing. No other tribunal, unless authorized by statute, could re-
examine the evidence offered at the hearing; and as long as the regu-
lations of the agency were within the statutory authority they were
due process of law to the alien. 1'
It was soon held, however, that the agency's decision must be
made on the basis of a hearing at which all the available evidence
was permitted.' 2 And examination of the evidence by way of the
writ of habeas corpus was soon forthcoming to determine whether
there was "adequate" support for the finding of the inspector-in
spite of the statute making the decision of the inspector "final."' 13 As
a conseqence, a decision could not be made upon anonymous accusa-
tions not preserved in the record.14
The scope of review upon habeas corpus' 5 is somewhat unsettled.
8. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893) ; see Tiaco
v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549, 557 (1913). This view has been criticized from the
outset. Justice Field, who wrote the majority opinion in Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889), sustaining the inherent power of the
United States to exclude any and all immigrants, vigorously dissented in
Fong Yue Ting, supra at 744, pointing out that the expulsion of an alien who
has acquired ties in this country was an entirely different matter.
9. See United States ex rel Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 294(1904).10. 39 Stat. 875 (1917), repealed by 66 Stat 198 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A.
§ 1225(a) (Supp. 1953). Congress has, from the beginning, sought to make
the decisions of the administrative agency final. See 26 Stat. 1085 (1891) ; §
242(b), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1252(b) (Supp. 1953).
11. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892).
12. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908).
13. See Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912).
14. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454 (1920) (alternative hold-ing).15. Traditionally the sole method of testing the validity of the order
of deportation has been by habeas corpus, which the courts have seen fit
to allow even in the absence of statutory authorization. See Orlow, Habeas
Corpus Immigration Cases, 10 Ohio St. L. J. 319 (1949).
Although McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162 (1950), allowed a
Vol. 37:440
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The rule most often alluded to is that the decision of the board will
be upheld if there is "any" or, at times, "some" evidence to support
it."" A great many cases in the circuit courts have expressed the
rule that the evidence required to sustain the board's findings must
be "substantial."' 1 Whatever the verbal standards, there is some
doubt whether many courts are not really imposing a much stricter
scrutiny over the conduct of the hearing. The most noteworthy ex-
ample is the case of Bridges v. Wixon,' s where six Supreme Court
Justices, the dissent apparently thought, did nothing more than
substitute their judgment upon the evidence for that of the ex-
amining inspector and the Attorney General. 19
No such review is possible where Congress has left matters to
agency discretion. For example, the Attorney General has been
given power to suspend deportation orders for those aliens who
could qualify under the statute.2 0 Some courts have held that the
statute allows no review whatsoever.2' The more considered view
seems to be that there is review at least to prevent arbitrary exercise
of discretion or exercise upon factors that Congress has not made
relevant.22 The alien seems to be entitled to individual consideration
petition for declaratory judgment to determine the alien's "status" under the
immigration and naturalization laws, the case is not authority for allowing
review of a deportation order. Nor is review permissible by virtue of § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (1946).
Heikkila v. Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 603 (1953). But see H. R. Rep. No. 2096,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1952).
16. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 149 (1945) ; Lloyd Sabaudo
Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (1932(; United States ex rel. Vajtauer
v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927) ("some" and "any").
17. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wlodinger v. Reimer, 103 F. 2d 435
(2d Cir. 1939) ; Kielema v. Crossman, 103 F. 2d 292 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Del
Castillo v. Carr, 100 F. 2d 338 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Davis, Administrative Law§ 221 (1951). However, some courts maintain that the scope of review under
habeas corpus is very different from the "substantial evidence" test required
by the APA. See Heikkila v. Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 603, 606 (1953) ; Yiakoumis
v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469, 472 (E.D. Va. 1949).
18. 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
19. See Davis, Administrative Law § 221 (1951).
20. § 244, 66 Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1254 (Supp. 1953),
formerly 62 Stat. 1206 (1948), 8 U. S. C. § 155(c) (Supp. 1952).
21. E.g,. Sleddens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F. 2d 363 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United
States cx reL. Zabadlija v. Garfinkel, 77 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1948),
aff'd per curiam, 173 F. 2d 222 (3d Cir. 1949); see United States ex rel.
Walther v. District Director, 175 F. 2d 693, 694 (2d Cir. 1949), rez'd on' other
grounds, 189 F. 2d 517 (2d Cir. 1951).
22. See United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaugnessy, 180 F. 2d 489,
491 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F. 2d
369, 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 876 (1948). The extreme difficulty
of securing judicial relief is discussed in 60 Yale L. J. 152 (1951).
The Attorney General also has discretion to allow deportables with good
moral character to depart voluntarily in lieu of deportation. § 244(e), 66
Stat. 214 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. 1254(e) (Supp. 1953), formerly 62 Stat.
1206 (1948), 8 U. S. C. § 155(c) (Supp. 1952). Here the same principles
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of his case,2 and where the Attorney General has promulgated regu-
lations creating a quasi-judicial procedure to enable him to exercise
his discretion, the alien must have a fair hearing and a decision based
solely on evidence in the record.
24
The language of the statutes authorizing the Attorney General
to release an alien on bail pending final disposal of his case 2  has
been as broad as the language concerning the discretionary power
to suspend deportation or allow voluntary departure. Yet before
Carlson v. Landon2- the courts had exercised considerable review
over the Attorney General's exercise of that power,27 setting stand-
ards to be considered by the Attorney General.28 Where there were
no indications that the alien previously released on bail would not
continue to be available in the future, a denial of bail was held
an abuse of discretion.
29
One petitioner in the Carlson case had previously been arrested
in deportation proceedings and released on bail pending the out-
come; after passage of the Internal Security Act of 195030 he was
rearrested without warrant. The others were arrested under the
Act and refused bail. All were permanent residents of the United
States-some having lived here most of their lives, and having
wives and families who were American citizens. There was nothing
to indicate that they would not be available if eventually ordered
deported, yet the order that they be held without bail-on the
ground that as members of the Communist Party they might in-
doctrinate others with false beliefs-was upheld by the Supreme
seem to apply-the courts asserting that there is no review, United States
ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F. 2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States ex rel.
Salvetti v. Reimer, 103 F. 2d 777 (2d Cir. 1939) ; cf. United States ex rel.
Zeller v. Watkins, 167 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1948), although it seems clear that a
manifest abuse of discretion will not be permitted. United States ex rel.
Engelbert v. Watkins, 84 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) ; cf. United States
ex reL. Hadrosek v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
23. Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950).
24. Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F. Supp. 421 (D. D.C. 1951).
25. § 242(a), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1252(a) (Supp.
1953), formerly 64 Stat. 1010 (1950), 8 U. S. C. § 156 (Supp. 1952).
26. 342 U. S. 524 (1952).
27. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Heikkinen v. Gordon, 190 F. 2d 16
(8th Cir. 1951), vacated per curiam, 344 U. S. 870 (1952) ; United States
ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, 177 F. 2d 708 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United States
ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 747 (2d Cir. 1948).
28. In id. at 751, the court listed the following considerations: "the
probability of the alien being found deportable, the seriousness of the charge
against him, if proved, the danger to the public safety of his presence within
the community, and the alien's availability for subsequent proceedings if
enlarged on bail."
29. United States ex rel. Heikkinen v. Gordon, 190 F. 2d 16 (8th Cir.
1951), vacated per curiam, 344 U. S. 870 (1952).
30. 64 Stat. 1010 (1950), repealed by § 242(a), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8
U. S. C. A. § 1252(a) (Supp. 1953).
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Court, four justices dissenting."' The majority reasoned that aliens
remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them
under the sovereign right to determine which noncitizens shall be
permitted to remain; the power belongs to the political branches
of the government and may be exercised entirely through execu-
tive officers with such opportunity for judicial review as Congress
may see fit to permit; and the Attorney General's discretion, prop-
erly delegated to subordinate officials, to grant or withhold bail
can be overturned only upon a showing of clear abuse. This deci-
sion, while not outside the philosophy of early cases, allows almost
unrestrained administrative control of a matter which the courts
are peculiarly competent to handle.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, court
review will, in many cases, be more difficult than ever to obtain.
Subjective opinions of executive officials rather than objective facts
have, in large measure, been substituted as the tests of the right
of entry or as grounds for deportation. Thus, aliens may be excluded
who "in the opinion of the consular officer... or... the Attorney
General ... are likely at any time to become public charges" ;32 or if
either of those officers "has reason to believe [the aliens] seek to
enter the United States . . . to engage in activities which would
be prejudicial to the public interest . . ." ;33 or if either "has reason-
able ground to believe [the alien] probably would . . . [engage in
subversive activities] . '' 4 Relief from exclusion on the grounds of
various affiliations may be obtained by establishing "to the satisfac-
tion of the consular officer" that such affiliation was innocent.35
An alien may be expelled who, "in the opinion of the Attorney
General, has within five years after entry become a public charge
from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen after entry" ;3
or if "it appears to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he
or she has failed or refused to fulfill his or her marital agreement
which in the opinion of the Attorney General was hereafter made
for the purpose of procuring his or her entry as an immigrant. '37
31. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 547, 558, 568, 569 (1952).
32. § 212(a) (15), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1182(a) (15)
(Supp. 1953).
33. § 212(a) (27), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1182(a) (27)
(Supp. 1953).
34. § 212(a) (29), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1182(a) (29)
(Sulp. 1953).
35. § 212(a) (28) (I), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1182(a)
(28) (I) (Supp. 1953).
36. § 241(a) (8), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1251(a) (8)(Supp. 1953).
37. § 241 (c), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1251(c) (Supp. 1953).
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In the past, similar indefinite delegations of authority have
been sustained. Under the Act of 1920,38 it was provided that
aliens convicted of listed crimes against the security of the United
States should be deported "if the Secretary of Labor ... finds that
such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States .... " This
indefinite delegation was sustained solely on the assumption that the
outline of crimes itself sufficiently clarified the class of aliens to be
deported.3 No issue could arise as to the validity of this statute
absent a prior conviction of. a specified crime-for the conviction
and a finding of undesirability were both necessary elements. There
is some possibility, therefore, that the present sections may be sub-
jected to scrutiny-at least to ensure that the opinions of the im-
migration officers be based on a fair hearing and substantial evidence.
The second competing principal struggling for recognition in the
field of deportation derives explicity from the Constitution: aliens are
"persons" within the meaning of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution. Therefore an alien may be secure
in his freedom of speech,40 his right to acquire, own and dispose
of property4" and to receive just compensation for property requisi-
tioned under the power of eminent domain,42 and the right to work
in a job or business of his choosing.43 This protection does not
entirely cease upon the issuance of a warrant for deportation. Thus,
an alien held for deportation is entitled to protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, 44 although there is some conflict
whether the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked.46
A whole body of law surrounding the deportation and exclusion
procedure has grown up by judicial decision, and the constitutional
protection of due process has become a part thereof.4" It was early
38. 41 Stat. 593 (1920).
39. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924).
40. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941) (by implication).
41. E.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
42. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931).
43. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U. S. 356 (1886); Fellman, The Alien's Right to Work, 22 Minn. L. Rev.
137, 153 (1938) ; Oppenheimer, The Constitutional Rights of Aliens, 1 Bill of
Rights Rev. 100, 103 (1941).
44. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 24 (D. Mass. 1920), reild on
other grounds, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922) ; Ex parte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110(D. Mont. 1920); see United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S.
149, 155 (1923); cf. United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832(D. Vt. 1899). But see Li Sing v. United States, 180 U. S. 486, 495 (1901);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730 (1893).
45. See Graham v. United States, 99 F. 2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1938) ;
Carlson v. London, 342 U. S. 524, 566 (1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Schoeps
v. Carmichael, 177 F. 2d 391, 400 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 914(1950). But see United States v. Lee Hee, 60 F. 2d 924, 925 (2d Cir. 1932).
46. Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D. D.C. 1948); see Lum Man
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established that an alien, although never lawfully admitted to the
United States, could not be deported without a fair hearing;47 and
an alien being excluded must have a hearing in accordance with an
antecedent definition of his rights.4 8 Although the hearing may be
summary, the agency's determination will be reversed as unfair
if it is conducted in a prejudicial atmosphere, 49 or without allowing
the alien to confer with counsel."0 Due process is also violated
where a deportation is ordered upon charges unsupported by any
evidence,"' or if the board ignores evidence favorable to the alien
without good reason.5 2 The alien must be given fair notice of the
specific charges that he must meet ;53 and the cross-examination of
witnesses or authors of affidavits made part of the evidence is a con-
stitutional right which cannot be abridged.5 4 Nevertheless, it has
been held that denial of the right to counsel in exclusion cases is not
a denial of due process.55
It will be observed that although these basic safeguards are re-
quired, the agency's inquiry is far from what would be necessary in
a judicial proceeding5 , or even in most administrative hearings in
other areas.5 7 Particularly criticized has been the Department's
practice of combining in one person the functions of prosecutor and
Sing v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Honolulu 1951) ; see Note, Due
Process Restrictions on Procedure it Alien Exclusion and Deportation Cases,
31 Col. L. Rev. 1013 (1931).
47. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903).
48. United States ex rel. Brandt v. District Director, 40 F. Supp. 371(S.D. N.Y. 1941).
49. Chun Kock Quon v. Proctor, 92 F. 2d 326 (9th Cir. 1937) ; Jouras
v. Allen, 222 Fed. 756 (8th Cir. 1915).
50. Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (9th Cir. 1918).
51. See United States ex reL. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S.
103, 106 (1927).
52. United States ex rel. Schachter v. Curran, 4 F. 2d 356 (3d Cir.
1925); Wong Kew v. Ward, 33 F. Supp. 994 (D. Mass. 1940) (exclusion).
53. E.g., Takeo Tadano v. Manney, 160 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Yuen
Boo Ming v. United States, 103 F. 2d 355 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Wong Sun Fay
v. United States, 13 F. 2d 67 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Unger v. Seaman, 4 F. 2d 80(8th Cir. 1924); Ex parte Woo Wah Ning, 67 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Wash.
1946) ; accord, Chang Chow v. United States, 63 F. 2d 375 (9th Cir. 1933).
Fair notice that the alien must sustain the burden of proof is also required.
United States cx rel. Giacalone v. Miller, 86 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
54. Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. 2d 934 (6th Cir. 1930) ; Maltez v. Nagle,
27 F. 2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Svarney v. United States, 7 F. 2d 515 (8th Cir.
1925) ; Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745 (8th Cir. 1915) ; cf. Chin Quong
Mew v. Tillinghast. 30 F. 2d 684 (1st Cir. 1929) ; see Sardo v. McGrath,
196 F. 2d 20, 22 D.C. Cir. 1952). But see United States ex reL. Ng Wing v.
Brough, 15 F. 2d 377 (2d Cir. 1926).
55. United States ex rel. Lew Chung Jon v. Commissioner, 18 F. Supp.
641 (S.D. N.Y. 1937), aff'd without opinion, 96 F. 2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1938).
56. See Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens 219-225(1932).
57. See Rep. Pres. Comm'n on Imm. & Nat., Whom We Shall Wel-
come 155-158 (1953), for a bibliography and summary of various appraisals of
immigration procedure.
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judge.5 1 But however unwise this combination, it has not been held
to render the hearing per se unfair.5 9 The judicial attempt3° to make
deportation proceedings conform to the Administrative Procedure
Act"' has been overcome by later Congressional action specifically
exempting exclusion and deportation hearings from its operation. 2
But in addition to holding the APA applicable, the Supreme Court
appeared to say that such an exemption might be unconstitutional.
Although that view has been said to have little support in previous
case law," the appeal to the Constitution is based on the fact that
the hearing afforded did not meet "at least currently prevailing
standards of impartiality."4 Lower courts, however, have sub-
sequently sustained the Congressional exemption.6-
Criticism has also been directed toward the provision of the
1952 Act 0 which allows an order of deportation to be made in
absentia if the alien is given reasonable opportunity to be present. 7
Vhether wise or unwise, this provision seems to be merely con-
firmatory of past practice, already sustained on the ground that de-
portation is not a criminal proceeding. s
Akin to the constitutional problem of whether Congress can
58. See id. at 161; Davis, Administrative Law § 118 et seq. (1951).
59. See, e.g., I.n re Giacobbi, 32 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. N.Y. 1939), affd
without opinion sub norn. United States ex rel. Giacobbi v. Fluckey, 111 F. 2d
297 (2d Cir. 1940).
60. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950).
61. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (1946).
62. 64 Stat. 1048 (1950), 8 U. S. C. § 155a (Supp. 1952). The 1952 Act
continues this exemption by describing a procedure which does not require
separation of judicial and prosecutorial functions, and which is the "sole and
exclusive" procedure for determining the deportability of an alien, § 242(b),
66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1252(b) (Supp. 1953), or admissibility
of an alien. § 236(a), 66 Stat. 200 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1226(a) (Supp.
1953).
63. See Davis, Administrative Law § 118 (1951).
64. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 50 (1950). The Court
went on: "A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty
and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be
returned, perhaps to life itself. It might be difficult to justify as measuring
us to constitutional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deporta-
tion procehdings the like of which has been condemned by Congress as unfair
even where less vital matters of property rights are at stake."
65. E.g., Belizaro v. Zimmerman, 200 F. 2d 282 (3d Cir. 1952). Justice
Jackson, however, has recently reaffirmed his opinion in the W ong Yang
Sung case that a deportation procedure not in conformance with the APA
might be constitutionally objectionable. See Shaugnessy v. United States
ex retl Mezei, 73 Sup. Ct. 625, 635-636 (1953) (dissenting opinion). Although
administrative regulations were issued to conform to the decision in the
Wong Yang Sung case, they were said to be rendered inoperative by the
subsequent Congressional action. See United States ex rel. Di Dente v. Ault,
101 F. Supp. 496, 498 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
66. § 242(b), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1252(b) (Supp. 1953).
67. See Sen. Rep. No. 1137 pt. 2, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952) (minority
views).
68. XVeinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F. 2d 778 (6th Cir. 1925).
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effect its deportation policies solely through administrative agencies
is the problem raised when failure to comply with the applicable
regulations is made the basis for criminal punishment. It was early
held that Congress could not authorize administrative officials to
arrest and imprison all Chinese found by the agency to be illegally
within the United States, since it is not consistent with due process
that Congress should, after having defined an offense, "find the fact
of guilt and adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents. '69
A somewhat similar problem is posed by Section 242(e) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,70 which provides that
any alien who wilfully refuses to depart from the country within six
months from the date of his deportation shall be guilty of a felony.
Although the statute assumes that a criminal trial shall be had, it
does not indicate whether during that trial the court may re-examine
the most important element of the crime-the order of deportation.
It has been contended that for these reasons the statute violates
the Fifth Amendment. 1 At least one federal district court has sus-
tained the statute by reference to the plenary power of Congress
over deportation and the power to effectuate its laws by administra-
tive control.
7 2
Analogous decisions do not provide authority for such a com-
plete deference to Congressional will. In a criminal prosecution for
violation of an OPA price control order it was held that failure to
test the validity of the order by the administrative procedure pro-
vided foreclosed that issue as a defense to the prosecution.7 3 The
court reasoned that there is no constitutional requirement that the
order be tested in one tribunal rather than another "so long as there
is an opportunity... for judicial review which satisfies the demands
of due process. . . . 14 Similarly, in a prosecution for accepting a
concession from a rate prescribed properly, the defense that the
69. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 237 (1896). But cf.
Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (1932) ; Oceanic Steam Naviga-
tion Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909) (money penalties).
70. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1252(e) (Supp. 1953),
formerly 64 Stat. 1012 (1950), 8 U. S. C. § 156(c) (Supp. 1952).
71. In United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169 (1952), the statute in
question was attacked on the ground that it was void for vagueness. The
majority of the Court did not reach the question presented here, while
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter dissented, condemning the statute as a
subtle attempt to avoid due process by making conclusive on the question of
the alien's unlawful presence an administrative determination not subject
to constitutional safeguards. Id. at 177.
72. United States v. Karasek, Criminal No. 1-7, S. D. Iowa, Jan. 2,
1953.
73. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 714 (1944).
74. Id. at 444 (emphasis supplied). The dissenting opinions were
vigorous. See id. at 448, 460 (Justices Roberts, Rutledge and Murphy).
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rate was unreasonable was not allowed because the policy of the
applicable act to secure uniform rates would be aborted by allowing
judges and juries in various districts to determine what rates were
reasonable. 75
Because of the qualifying factors, neither of these cases sustains
the provisions in question. Therefore, their validity seems in doubt
unless the constitutional issue can be avoided. Since the defendants
in at least two cases 6 involving this problem were aliens who could
not be deported because they were not citizens of any existing coun-
try,77 the Act could be construed as not applying to them.78 This
construction is unlikely, since the statute was specifically intended
by Congress to solve the problem of "non-deportables.1
7
9
Another possible solution is the one reached in the Selective
Service classification cases, where it has been held that the defendant
in a prosecution for violation of the Selective Service order could
interpose the defense that the order was unlawful.80 Review has
been limited to a determination of whether there was some basis
in fact for the classification."' There is no reason to suppose that
the Court would give any less a review in the deportation cases.
Nor is there reason to suppose they will invalidate an act of Con-
gress where a formidable constitutional question can be ignored
by granting some review of the order.
The influence of the fact that deportation and exclusion laws
inevitably involve the rights of citizens has given rise to one im-
portant exception to the "finality" of administrative control. In
Ng Fung Ho v. White,82 it was held that one who has asserted in
expulsion proceedings that he is a citizen of the United States and
75. United States v. Vacuum Oil Co., 158 Fed. 536 (W.D. N.Y. 1908),
aff'd, 179 Fed. 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 218 U. S. 681 (1910).
76. United States v. Spencer, 343 U. S. 169 (1952) ; United States v.
Karasek, Criminal No. 1-7, S. D. Iowa, Jan. 2, 1953.
77. See King and Ginger, The McCarran Act and the Immigration;
Laws, 11 Law. Guild Rev. 128, 137 (1951).
78. See United States ex rel. Wiczynsky v. Shaughnessy, 185 F. 2d
347, 349 (2d Cir. 1950).
79. See 96 Cong. Rec. 10675 (1950). Some deportees had demonstrated
that personal application was successful in gaining admission into a country
where official action had been futile. The statute was to induce them to aid in
their own deportation.
80. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946). It is difficult to accept
the reasoning of the Court that review was allowed only because the selec-
tive service board had "exceeded its jurisdiction" in classifying the petitioner
in violation of what the Court thought the Selective Service Regulations
demanded.
81. See Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442 (1947). Justices Murphy
and Rutledge dissented on the ground that such narrow review would not
sustain the constitutionality of the conviction. Id. at 457.
82. 259 U. S. 276 (1922).
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supports his claim with substantial evidence8 3 is entitled to a de novo
court trial upon that issue. s This holding was a departure from the
reasoning of earlier exclusion cases which had held that even though
jurisdiction of the board over the petitioner would be lacking if he
proved to be a citizen, no judicial review was permissible except to
determine whether the finding was arbitrary 5 or without any
evidence to support it.8s
Thereafter the lines were drawn. In exclusion cases, the findings
of the administrative officers would be final-even on the issue
of citizenship. In expulsion cases, the expellee must be given a
court trial. Some justification for the distinction could be made
in the ordinary exclusion case, where one is entering the United
States for the first time. Even where he is seeking admission as a
citizen, the hardship resulting from a denial of his right to enter
would not approach the extreme losses which might be incurred by
one uprooted from his permanent residence and banished to what
might be to him a "foreign" land.
As was pointed out above, 87 however, even a United States
domiciliary is regarded as an entering immigrant if he leaves the
country-even temporarily and with an intent to return. Although
in immigration nomenclature his hearing would be regarded as an
exclusion proceeding, it is obvious that the extreme hardship which
the Arg Fung Ho case sought to obviate for expulsion would be
present here. Nevertheless, some courts have consistently refused
to extend the Ng Fung Ho doctrine to this kind of case. 88 Others
have recognized that the rights of a possible citizen should not be de-
termined by the form of the proceeding if he shows prior residence
in the United States.8
83. Judicial due process becomes necessary whenever the alien presents
some claim to citizenship, even though his evidence is no more than his own
testimony. Espino v. Wixon, 136 F. 2d 96 (9th Cir. 1943) ; see United States
v. Wong Gong, 70 F. 2d 107 (9th Cir. 1934).
84. The decision rests partly on the sometvhat discredited "jurisdictional
fact" theory of judicial review of administrative orders, but probably its
primary basis is merely a recognition of the vastly greater security afforded by
udicial process and the great need for security in light of the risk to loss of
iberty involved. See Davis, Administrative Law § 255 (1951).
85. See Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673 (1912).
86. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905). As was to be ex-
pected, various tests were voiced as to the amount of evidence required to sus-
tain the finding. See, e.g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454 (1920)
("adequate" evidence).
87. See note 7 supra and text thereto.
88. E.g., United States ex rel. Medeiros v. Watkins, 166 F. 2d 897 (2d
Cir. 1948). See also In re K .................... (56143/464), 1 Dec. Imm. & Nat. L.
587 (1943).
89. Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F. 2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Lee Fong
Fook v. Wixon, 170 F. 2d 245 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 914
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Some of the criticism of those cases which denied judicial trial
was thought to be unjust 0 in light of Section 503 of the Nationality
Act of 194091 which provided for a declaratory judgment action for
any person denied rights by an official on the ground that he was
not a citizen. This provision has now been repealed by the 1952
Act9 2 and its counterpart 93 expressly excepts from its operation any
disputes of citizenship which arise by reason of any exclusion pro-
ceeding. The intent of Congress to prohibit judicial intervention is
clear. But since the courts have never given complete finality to
administrative rulings and have generally guarded the determination
of citizenship with especial care, they are not likely to revert to the
complete abdication once observed. Actually, it can be argued that
one returning to his domicile in this country deserves greater con-
stitutional protection that one who has never resided here. It must
be noted, however, that if granting a judicial trial on the citizenship
issue is made by the Supreme Court to depend on prior residence,
the doctrine of United States v. Ju Toy,9 4 from which the whole
issue has sprung, will actually be overruled, for in the Ju Toy case
the petitioner was actually a prior resident returning after a tempo-
rary absence.
The constitutional rights once accorded to aliens have been
made extremely nebulous by two recent cases. The first of these
is United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.93 A Presidential
Proclamation," 6 supplemented by a regulation of the Attorney Gen-
eral,9 7 provided that an alien seeking admission could be excluded
and deported without a hearing if the Attorney General found him
excludable upon the basis of information the disclosure of which
(1949). The ratiocination of these decisions has been to seize upon language
in some of the earlier decisions in which the courts were denying judicial
trial only to persons who had never resided in the United States. E.g., QuonQuon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 358 (1927) ; United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U. S. 253, 263 (1905) ; cf. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38, 77 (1936) (concurring opinion).
90. See United States ex rel. Chu Leung v. Shaughnessy, 176 F. 2d
249, 250 (2d Cir. 1949).
91. 54 Stat. 1171 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 903 (1946).
92. 66 Stat. 280 (1952).
93. § 360, 66 Stat. 273 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1503 (Supp. 1953).
94. 198 U. S. 253 (1905). See note 86 supra and text thereto for discus-
sion of the doctrine.
95. 338 U. S. 537 (1950).
96. Proc. No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941).
97. 8 Code Fed. Regs. § 175.57 (1949). The operation of this regulation
has now become notorious since the exclusion and long detention of Ellen
Knauff, the war bride of an American soldier who finally secured admission
into the country after a storm of public protest had forced a hearing which
failed to disclose conceivable grounds for her exclusion. Knauff, The Ellen
Knauff Story (1952).
[Vol. 37:440
NOTES
would be prejudicial to the public interest. The Supreme Court re-
fused to hold this procedure invalid, asserting that the power to
exclude is inherent in the executive, and the alien has no right to
admission but only a privilege on such terms as the United States
may provide.
In accordance with a long line of cases which had held that a
resident alien who temporarily departs from the country is, when
he returns, in the same position as one who has entered for the first
time,08 the rule of the Knauff case was applied in the lower courts
in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding to an alien who had signed on a
United States merchant ship and upon his return was excluded
without a hearing.90 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
petitioner's long residence in the United States took him out of the
class of aliens being "excluded"-and therefore he was not within
the purview of the regulation. 00 This holding provides only a
temporary escape from the constitutional question, for the regula-
tion authorizing exclusion without a hearing has become part of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ;101 where Congress
has expressly included those of petitioner's class within the defini-
tion of aliens seeking "entry" into the United States. 102
There are strong arguments for accepting the Court's dicta that
the constitutional status which the alien indispensably enjoyed prior
to his departure was not terminated thereby. The Court seemed
to be giving expression to the principle that restraints on the power
to deport or exclude depend not upon the inalienable and sovereign
nature of the power but upon the degree of constitutional protection
to which the person is entitled. One month later, however, in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,'03 this principle seems
to have been forgotten. The Supreme Court held, four justices dis-
senting,' 04 that a twenty-five year resident who left the country
temporarily to visit his mother could, on his return, be excluded
without a hearing and confined indefinitely on Ellis Island although,
98. E.g., United States ex reL. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422 (1933) ;
Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78 (1914); Schoeps v. Carmichael 177 F. 2d
391 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 914 (1950) ; EX parte Rodriguez,
15 F. 878 (S.D. Tex. 1926). But cf. Petition of Hersvik, 1 F. 2d 449 (S.D.
Cal. 1924).
99. United States ex reL. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 97 F. Supp. 592(E.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 192 F. 2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1951).
100. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590 (1953).
101. § 235(c), 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1225(c) (Supp.
1953).
102. § 101(a) (13), 66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1101(a) (13)(Supp. 1953).
103. 73 Sup. Ct. 625 (1953).
104. Id. at 631, 632 (Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson).
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after the United States had branded him an undesirable, no other
country could be found to which he could be sent. While affirming
the constitutional basis for the Kwong Hai Chew decision, a distinc-
tion was sought between the two cases on the ground that there
the petitioner was, on embarkation, cleared by the Coast Guard and
although voluntarily in foreign ports, was continuously at sea.' 51
If this reasoning could be compromised with the historical test to
determine when an alien is to be treated as "entering" for the pur-
poses of enforcing the exclusion and deportation laws,'06 still it
could not be accepted as a rational basis for determining a resi-
dent's constitutional rights.10 7 Both petitioners were long time resi-
dents. It would not seem that constitutional protection could be
given to one and denied another on the grounds either of a clearance
by the Coast Guard or a failure to negotiate the gangway when in a
foreign port. As the Court in Kwong Hai Chew clearly pointed out,
"Iflrom a constitutional point of view, he is entitled to due process
without regard to whether or not, for immigration purposes, he is to
be treated as an entrant alien. ..""'
Those cases which have consistently affirmed the operation of
procedural due process have not restricted their operation to expul-
sion proceedings. Often they have held that even the alien stopped
at the border is entitled to some constitutional protection 0 0 Further,
the Japanese Immigrant Case,'"' relied on so often for the proposi-
tion that a hearing is constitutionally required in expulsion cases,
actually involved an exchsion. Therefore the Court in the Knauff
and Mezei cases-in stating that an alien seeking admission had no
rights other than those Congress, acting through the executive,
saw fit to give-was ignoring the decisions of the last fifty years.
105. Id. at 630.
106. Afh example of the situations giving rise to the question of what
an "entry" is within the meaning of the immigration laws is that which occurs
when deportation is sought on the ground that the alien has committed a crime
within five years "after entry." See § 241 (a) (4), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8
U. S. C. A. § 1251 (a) (4) (Supp. 1953), formerly 39 Stat. 889 (1917), 8
U. S. C. § 155(a) (1946). Historically, even a seaman on an American ship
has been regarded as making an "entry" on his return if the ship had docked
at foreign ports. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S.
129 (1932) ; United State ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398 (1929).
107. Neither of the cases cited by the majority, United States ex rel.
Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U. S. 279 (1932) ; Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U. S. 538 (1895), sheds any light on the constitutional problem presented
here. But see Van Laeken v. Wixon, 84 Supp. 958, 963 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
108. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 600 (1953).
109. E.g., Chun Kock Quon v. Proctor, 92 F. 2d 326 (9th Cir. 1937);
Chin Quong Mew v. Tillinghast, 30 F. 2d 684 (1st Cir. 1929) ; United States
ex rel. Schachter v. Curran, 4 F. 2d 356 (3d Cir. 1925) ; Chew Hoy Quong
v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (9th Cir. 1918).
110. 189 U. S. 86 (1903).
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The Mevei case, of course, is an extreme extension even of the
Knauff case, for it does not follow from the Congressional power to
exclude that the alien can be confined without the right to confront
his accusers beyond the time when deportation is shown to be im-
possible."'
A holding that an alien seeking entry has some rights would not
mean that the fundamental difference between expulsion and exclu-
sion would be overlooked. It would mean only that the alien detained
at a port of entry be entitled at least to a fair hearing to determine
whether he falls within the classes of excludable aliens which Con-
gress has defined. 1"2
LIMITATIONS ON SUBSTANCE
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,' 3 the Supreme Court was faced
with the problem of whether the constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto legislation may be applied to a deportation statute.
Petitioners had all come into this country at an early age and had,
at various times in the past-one as long ago as 1929-been mem-
bers of the Communist Party. Their deportation was sought in com-
pliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940"4 which for the first
time authorized deportation for past membership in the Commu-
nist Party. As the statute existing before 1940115 was construed-
in 1939, membership in the Party after entry did not remain cause
for deportation after it had ceased." 6 Therefore it became possible
to deport aliens for past membership in an organization for which
they could not have been deported a year earlier. Cavalierly stating
that the law was not retroactive in effect, the Court in the Harisiades
case refused to reconsider what it regarded as settled law-that the
ex post facto limitation can only apply to laws imposing criminal
punishment, and that deportation was neither a criminal proceeding
nor punishment."17 Admittedly underlying the decision was the
doctrine that our policy toward aliens is so "exclusively entrusted to
the political branches ... as to be largely immune from judicial...
111. See United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F. 2d 964, 968(2d Cir. 1952), re-,'d. 73 Sup. Ct. 625 (1953).
112. "Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the
sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself
against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but
which are bound to occur on ex parte consideration." Shaughnessy v. United
States ex reL. Mezei, 73 Sup. Ct. 625, 635 (1953) (Justice Jackson's dissent-
ing opinion, referring to the Knauff case).
113. 342 U. S. 580 (1952).
114. 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 155(a) (1946).
115. 40 Stat. 1012 (1918).
116. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 (1939).
117. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 594 (1952).
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interference. 118 It is not true, however, that the provisions against
ex post facto legislation apply only to strictly criminal proceedings.
Although those instances where the ex post facto prohibition has
been applied to civil penalties-"9 have been explained as disabilities
which were really criminal penalties in disguise,120 it would seem
that the banishment of residents for acts which constitute crimes by
municipal law would fall within that same category.' 2'
The idea that deportation is not punishment deserves considera-
tion only because it is so often misapplied. It may be traced to the
case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States,122 but it was there applied
only to an alien who had entered the country illegally-the Court
asserting that deportation was not punishment for anything done in
the United States. 23 The case of Calder v. Bull 24 was cited by
the majority in the Harisiades case for the holding that "ex post
facto" applies only to criminal statutes, but the soundness of that
case has been questioned. 25 Further, those cases cited for the propo-
sition that the ex post facto prohibition will not apply to deporta-
tion laws' 20 fail, on their facts, to sustain that assertion.127 The
118. Id. at 588.
119. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 337 (U.S. 1866), held that an act
of Congress which imposed an oath upon those who wanted to practice before
the federal courts could not disqualify an attorney who was not in a position
to take the oath because of past conduct. Accord, Cummings v. Missouri,
4 Wall. 277, 319 (U.S. 1866) ; cf. Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234 (U.S.
1872). Certainly a proceeding to vindicate one's privilege to practice law is
not a criminal proceeding. Yet these laws were invalid as ex post facto.
That the principle of these cases still survives is evidenced by their recent
approval in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
120. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381, 385 (1878).
121. This is evident from the recent application to deportation statutes
of the "void for vagueness" test of criminal statutes. See Jordan v. De George,
341 U. S. 223, 231 (1951): "Despite the fact that this is not a criminal
statute, we shall nevertheless examine the application of the vagueness doc-
trine to this case."
122. 149 U. S. 698 (1893), cited in Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S.
585, 591 (1913), which was cited in -arisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U. S.
580, 594 (1952).
123. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra note 122 at 730.
124. 3 Dall. 386 (U.S. 1798).
125. The records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which indi-
cate that the Convention had more than restraints on criminal laws in mind,
were not available at the time the case was decided. McAllister, EX Post
Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 Calif. L. Rev.
269, 270 (1927). It has also been pointed out that contemporary usage and
the records of the state ratifying conventions evidence a far different definition
of the term from that given by the Court. See Crosskey, Politics and the Con-
stitution in the History of the United States 324-351 (1953). In any event,
the decision, while it attempts to set out that which is included in he ex post
provision, is not authority for that which is not within its condemnation-as
evidenced by the later cases cited note 119 supra.
126. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228
U. S. 585 (1913) ; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 (1912).
127. See Boudin, The Settler Within Our Gates:III, 26 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 634, 637 (1951).
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willingness of the Supreme Court in the Harisiades case to be bound
by them is therefore-in light of the retroactive provisions of the
1952 Act 2 8-- an extremely unfortunate extension of judicial stoicism
in regard to measures which may result to the alien in the "loss of
both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living. 1"2 9
Undoubtedly the most vital question raised by a consideration
of the scope of the expulsion power is a substantive one: can Con-
gress validly make the right to avoid banishment depend upon
conditions which it could not forbid generally because of the prohi-
bitions of the Bill of Rights? The only important decision seeming
to hold the affirmative of that question is a case where the expellee
was not a permanent resident of the United States but had come
for the sole purpose of giving a lecture tour in advocacy of anarch-
ism."3" And it must be noted that the holding of the court was not
that a mere philosophical anarchist could be deported, but that
the alien actually advocated violent overthrow of the Government
and was not within the protection of the First Amendment.' It has
been pointed out 32 that each of the other cases historically cited
for the bold proposition that there is no constitutional limit to the
power of Congress to exclude or expel aliens133 can be shown to
hold actually must less. Each can be explained on the ground that
its facts involve exclusion rather than expulsion,"34 aliens not legally
within the country,"'3 aliens merely seeking transit,"36 or not in-
volving deportation at all.
137
Congress could, of course, abolish all immigration whatsoever
or exclude any classes of immigrants. And probably no one would
contend that it would raise a substantive constitutional question if
Congress ordered deportation of anyone who entered the country
in violation of its restrictions. But if resident aliens are constitu-
128. All grounds for deportation in the 1952 Act are applicable not-
withstanding that the factual basis for deportation occurred prior to the enact-
ment of the Act. § 241(d), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1251(d)
(Supp. 1953).
129. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922).
130. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279 (1904).
131. Id. at 294.
132. See the painstaking refutation of the whole notion of the unre-
strained power of Congress over deportation in Boudin, The Settler Within
Our Gates, 26 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 266, 451, 634 (1951).
133. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279,
290 (1904) ; Prentiss v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d 422, 423 (6th Cir. 1926).
134. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895) ; Nishi-
mura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889).
135. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893).
136. Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296 (1902).
137. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896).
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tional "persons" with respect to their life, liberty and property, 38
there is no reason why they should not continue to be "persons"
with respect to the most important of all rights-the right to remain
in the country.
This is an area where "the tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic" 139 is notoriously evident. But the prin-
ciple must be tested in the light of changed circumstances. When the
Fong Yue Ting case 140 was decided in 1893, the expulsion process
as it is known today did not exist-for deportation was largely
a mere adjunct of exclusion and was available for only a few years
after entry.141 The grounds did not read, as they do today under the
McCarran Act, like a penal code. Nor was deportation the extreme
measure that it is today, for not until 1918's2 did it become a felony
for an alien once deported to return to this country.
The present Act provides for deportation for mere membership
or affiliation with the Communist Party, 43 although the alien does
not understand its conspiratorial character, is not aware of its sub-
ordination to a foreign power, and does not subscribe to its doctrine
of violence. 1  While Communism is essentially an alien force,'14 it
does not follow that the admittedly innocent can be condemned with
the guilty. There is no doubt that membership alone could not be
made the basis of other punishments or withdrawals of privilege "4
It would be exceedingly injudicious to hold that a resident could be
banished to what might be a strange land 4 7 for the same conduct. 48
138. See notes 40-43 sitpra and text thereto. It has been suggested, see
Boudin, supra note 132, at 451, that persons who enter a country with the
intention of establishing a permanent home and becoming part of the com-
munity are not "aliens" at all in the constitutional sense.
139. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1925).
140. 149 U. S. 698 (1893).
141. 26 Stat. 1086 (1891).
142. 40 Stat. 1012 (1918).
143. § 241(a) (6) (C), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1251 (a) (6)
(C) (Supp. 1953).
144. Latva v. Nicolls, 106 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mass. 1952).
145. See Sen. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 782 (1950).
146. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
147. An alien is subject to deportation, of course, long after his immi-
gration into the United States and long after losing all ties with the country
of his birth. But even recent arrivals are subject to being sent to a completely
strange land. If the c6untry designated by the alien does not accept him, and
certain others refuse, he may be sent to any country in the world which will
take him. § 243(a), 66 Stat. 212 (1952), 8 U. S. C. A. § 1253(a) (Supp.
1953).
148. The issue whether mere membership in the Communist Party can
be the ground for deportation was before the Supreme Court in Heikkila v.
Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 603 (1953), but the case was disposed of on a pro-
cedural issue.
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